The Snow Killings Page 7
The convict told them he “doubted that the murderer, whom he described as psychotic, would be interested in such a venture. In addition, he felt there was too much heat on child pornography to find any market at this time.” The convict said he believed the killer was going to continue: “He is going to keep it up. Just why in the hell does he do it all in one locality, except he is screaming for you to catch him.”23
By March 1978, the task force reported it had received more than 15,000 tips and had cleared closed to 9,500. The remaining 5,500 were deemed “low priority.”
As 1978 came to a close, the task force had run out of money and was slated to shut down. In November, Task Force Commander Robert Robertson found himself on the defense, lamenting: “This has been an extremely difficult case.” He said the combination of victims of both sexes, the lack of significant eyewitnesses, the killer’s mysterious motive, all contributed to the failure. “There is not a case like this in the Free World,” he said.24
After some 5,000 interviews and nearly 18,000 tips, the Task Force had failed to charge even one suspect. In short order, the case files were packed up and stored at Michigan State Police Second District Headquarters in Northville.
On December 12, 1978, three days before the Task Force officially shut down, Robertson composed letters to the parents of all four victims. To Barry and Marion King, he wrote:
As you already know, the Oakland County Task Force will move its existing quarters on December 15, 1978. All files and information will be moved to the Michigan State Police District Headquarters office in Northville.
Everyone at the Task Force shares my thoughts on how sorry we are that we have not as yet brought Timmy’s abductor to justice. But I want you to know that we will always continue to consider the file open until we have exhausted all avenues or until we do apprehend the person responsible.
The Task Force members will meet every two weeks for several months to make assignments to the individual officers, to discuss new information, and to keep the unit in a ready state.
Obviously, we don’t feel the personal loss you do, but Timmy has been a great part of all our lives during the last twenty months.
I would like to thank everyone in your home for doing their best to help us do our job. So many times, we bothered the family for an answer and you were always very gracious to us.
Once again, from all of us at the Oakland County Task Force, good luck and may God be with you.25
If the shutdown of the Task Force seemed suspiciously abrupt, the community was evidently too shell-shocked to voice any concerns. That law enforcement might be concealing a prime suspect, at the bidding of an influential family, was beyond imagining. That a cover-up could evade the largest manhunt in U.S. history was inconceivable.
During the first few years after the murders stopped, a series of quotes from Task Force officials reported in the media all followed a pattern. On the anniversaries of the murders or before a predicted snowfall, reporters would routinely circle back to their police sources to ask why the case was never solved. With striking similarity, the top brass offered “It was taken care of” hypotheticals.
Three officers at the top of command in the Michigan State Police-run Task Force—Lt. Robert Robertson, commander of the Task Force from its inception until January 1980; Det. Sgt. Joseph Krease, Robertson’s right-hand man; and Lt. Joseph Koenig, Robertson’s successor—all spun a theory that the killer had been committed to a mental institution by his wealthy family, and that so long as he was locked up and no other children would be killed, they saw no reason to hand him over to authorities. Alongside this theory, Robertson offered the shrugging conclusion that the investigation had ended in complete failure and that the crimes could not or would not be solved.
(Author’s emphasis added)
People Magazine, December 1977: “Others believe the man may be in a mental institution…. The score is Killer—4, Police—0. If it ends here, in all likelihood the Oakland County child killer will never be caught. ‘Probably not,’ even Lt. Robertson admits.”26
Royal Oak Daily Tribune, March 22, 1978: Second in command on the Task Force, MSP Det. Sgt. Joseph Krease “also says some persons believe the killer may be in a mental hospital committed there by wealthy family members. ‘Perhaps someone knows about it, but feels that because he is being treated, there is no reason to come forward.’”27
The Eccentric, June 15, 1978: “The killer is in a mental institution. The theory is that the killer’s family had him committed and never notified authorities because they because they believed this would prevent him from killing again.”28
The Detroit News, December 11, 1978: Task Force Commander Lt. Robert Robertson said: “‘[It] is bitterly disappointing to have worked so hard and long without finding the one tip, the one name, the one shred of evidence that would put a maniac in prison.’
“‘There are crimes that are just not going to be solved. If you are a professional, you realize that. I don’t know of anything we didn’t do, except for the obvious: We didn’t solve these crimes. It’s just that simple.’
“Discussing how the task force will be reactivated if necessary and how the killer could have stopped killing: ‘If I had to pin it down, I would guess that he’s in an institution or that he’s dead,’ Robertson said. ‘But I wouldn’t bet 10 cents on it and I can’t support it. Anything’s a possibility. … Either somebody has absolute direct knowledge or at least suspicions that a friend or relative is the killer and has not come forward with it. If the right person would call us, hopefully he’d be caught before the day is out.’”29
The Investigator, Fall, 1979, “Where is the Oakland County child killer?” By Robert H. Robertson and Jerry J. Tobias: “The killer is in a mental institution. The feeling here is that the individual has been privately committed to a mental facility. The family, somewhere during the abduction periods, became suspicious of their member’s involvement and, being financially able, committed the individual. They rationalized that since this would prevent him from killing again, and may in fact change his behavior, it was the right thing to do. Turning him into authorities, according to the family, would prove fruitless and would negate him getting the needed therapy. They may also have been motivated to take this step to avoid embarrassment to the family name. Confidentiality was further maintained and adhered to by the medical staff of the facility. They were of the opinion that since he posed no threat to society while an inpatient, and although his past deeds were horrifying, they nevertheless were done and couldn’t be changed. Thus, they didn’t feel obligated to share this information with authorities.”30
The Detroit News, March 16, 1980: “Why hasn’t the killer struck again? Authorities admit that of the dozens of theories one is as good as another. But [newly appointed Task Force Commander MSP Sgt. Joseph] Koenig has a new theory—a long shot, he admits on what happened to the killer. ‘What if the killer is from a very wealthy family?’ he said. ‘Suppose the parents discover their son is the killer and send him off to Europe for psychiatric treatment. The family name is spared, their son is receiving treatment and they are sure no one else will be killed. They can live with that.’”31
The Kings maintain that the “They” in Koenig’s “They can live with that” refers not only to the killer’s wealthy family, but also to themselves, the victims’ families. With hindsight Cathy Broad reflected: “Koenig’s comments reveal something even sicker—that someone at the highest levels of law enforcement made the decision for us that if the families knew what they knew, we would be just fine with keeping quiet and getting on with our lives.”
It would take decades for the public to discover how closely this theory aligned with events. Of course, by then, too many witnesses had died and too much evidence was lost or destroyed to be able to prove it.
* * *
1. Mary Ellen Kirby, James McClear, Pat Shellenbarger, Joel Smi
th, Michael Wowk, John McAleenan (Headline missing), The Detroit News, March 23, 1977, 3A.
2. Mary Ellen Kirby, “Finder of Tim’s Body Is Haunted by Sight,” The Detroit News, March 24, 1977, 1B.
3. Notes of Det. Sgt. Brandemihl from Dr. Werner Spitz, Chief Medical Examiner, Wayne County Medical Examiner’s Office, Autopsy No: A77-472, March 23, 1977, 4.
4. Dr. Werner Spitz, Chief Medical Examiner, Wayne County Medical Examiner’s Office, “Homicide of Timothy King: Autopsy Report” Transcription of conversation between Spitz and law enforcement, 7.
5. Bill Michelmore, “Pews are Filled for Timothy King’s Funeral,” Detroit Free Press, March 26, 1977, 3A.
6. Mary Ellen Kirby and Ronald L. Russell (Headline missing) The Detroit News, March 25, 1977, 2B.
7. Barbara Doerr and Mary Ellen Kirby, “Slain girl’s father is angry at police,” The Detroit News, March 27, 1977, 1A.
8. Mary Ellen Kirby and James McClear, “Autopsy Shows King Boy Was Well Cared For,” The Detroit News, March 24, 1977, 1A.
9. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Finding the Child Killer in the Woodward Corridor, July, 1977, 21.
10. James A. McClear and Joel J. Smith, “Police Ask for Help from Anyone Who May Counsel Killer,” The Detroit News, March 27, 1977, 5A.
11. Michael F. Wendland, “Killer Stirs Fear,” The Detroit News, May 31, 1977, 1A.
12. Douglas Ilke, “Victims’ Clean Bodies,” The Detroit News, March 25, 1977, 6A.
13. Joel Smith and James McClear “Dragnet” The Detroit News, March 25, 1977, 1A.
14. Bruce L. Danto, M.D., “Psychiatrist’s Plea to Timothy’s Killer” The Detroit News, March 27, 1977.
15. “Convict faces life in ’76 rape-killing,” Detroit Free Press, May 5, 1979, 11.
16. “N.C. man arraigned in baby-sitter murder,” Detroit Free Press, June 30, 1978, 17.
17. McIntyre, Wolf, 173.
18. McIntyre, Wolf, 177.
19. McIntyre, Wolf, 184.
20. Billy Bowles, “Callers Say They Know Killer’s Pal,” Detroit Free Press, May 17, 1979, 3.
21. Jane Briggs-Bunting and Julie Morris, “In Oakland County the Horror Seems Past,” Detroit Free Press, June 26, 1977, 1C.
22. Robert L. Wells, “Child Murders ‘Fragmented,’” The Detroit News, August 2, 1977. 1B.
23. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), Finding the Child Killer in the Woodward Corridor, July, 1977. 16.
24. Julie Morris, “Oakland Child Killer Hunt Will Quit,” Detroit Free Press, November 21, 1978, 1A.
25. McIntyre, Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 231.
26. Cheryl McCall, “A Shadowy Child Killer Claims Four Victims and Holds Detroit's Suburbs in a Grip of Fear,” People magazine, December 5, 1977.
27. John Michalak, “Murder Task Force to Wind Down,” The Daily Tribune (Royal Oak), March 22, 1977, 21.
28. Joe Martucci, “Police Theories Abound on Oakland Child Killer,” The Eccentric, June 15, 1978. 14A.
29. Pat Shellenberger, “Hunt for … Ends As,” The Detroit News, December 11, 1978. 1B.
30. Robert H. Robertson and Jerry Tobias, “Where is the Oakland County Child Killer?” The Investigator, Fall, 1979, 18.
31. Joel J. Smith, no headline available, The Detroit News, March 16, 1980, 1B.
3
A Sinister Confluence of Events
The unspeakable crimes that beset Oakland County from February 1976 to March 1977 by no means happened in a vacuum. If the sixties gave rise to the hippie movement’s “peace and love” mantra, the seventies produced its antithesis. The Watergate era transformed us into a nation of cynics; the economy mirrored that pessimism.
In 1973, the oil embargo led to frustration and long gas lines. At the same time, the 1973–75 recession was marked by both high inflation and high unemployment. Crime rates soared, making the seventies one of America’s most violent decades.
An unprecedented string of infamous serial killers—Ted Bundy, Son of Sam, the Zodiac Killer, John Wayne Gacy, the Golden State Killer, and the Hillside Strangler— spawned widespread fear. With the country still reeling from the brutal murders of Sharon Tate and six others in 1967, Charles Manson and three of his disciples were sentenced in January 1971. While behind bars, Manson’s special brand of mayhem lingered for years as his followers promulgated his “Helter Skelter” worldview and aimed to impress him with their own violent acts.
There was also a new menace spreading throughout the country, though it was largely hidden to all but the major players. Appalling in scope, child pornography and prostitution became a highly organized, multi-million-dollar industry in the mid-seventies. Traffickers in child exploitation operated almost completely underground using home movie cameras, clandestine printing operations, and newsletters as nationwide conduits. Filming took place not just in seedy Times Square basements, but in suburban homes as well. As a Cook County, Illinois, state’s attorney investigator explained to a news reporter, various forms of child pornography were “spreading to the suburbs where they are now considered rare items, delicacies.”1
In May 1977, the Chicago Tribune published the four-part series “Child Pornography: Sickness for Sale,” at the time the most extensive investigation into child pornography and child prostitution in the U.S. The series was carried in more than 200 newspapers nationwide. Among its findings: “These industries involve films made in private apartments, children lured into sexual misconduct by drugs, alcohol, money, and expensive gifts, and adult exploiters who range from the dregs of society to prominent men, including several millionaires and at least one clergyman.”2
Most Americans were unaware of the abhorrent reality that children were being exploited on such a mass scale. For those who knew it was going on, denial played a major role in shutting the door on sexual predation of our most vulnerable—as it continues to today. The worldwide sexual abuse scandal involving Catholic priests went on unabated for decades before it was revealed, in 2002, that thousands of predators were allowed to flourish in the most unsuspecting of places. College football coach Jerry Sandusky began “The Second Mile,” the charity organization in which he groomed his victims, in 1977, the year the second and third OCCK victims went missing.3 Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1999 to 2007, preyed on boys of the high school wrestling team he coached 1965–1981. In the most recent and in-your-face example of evil cloaked in privilege, billionaire financier Jeffrey Epstein subjected untold numbers of underage girls, some of them 11 and 12 years old, to bondage and sex abuse by powerful men. Finally, in 2019, child sex-trafficking charges stuck and Epstein was behind bars after being denied bail. But after 33 days in custody, Epstein, 66, died from what authorities have ruled a suicide by hanging in a federal jail in New York City.4
Beginning in early 1976, the child pornography industry in the U.S. took off with the importation of child porn magazines and films from Europe. Produced largely in the Netherlands, they quickly became big sellers in U.S. adult bookshops. Sensing a good business opportunity, American pornographers began to produce home-grown child porn using real children and rushed it into market. (Europeans had faked their provocative images of children, using women who looked very young and posing them as Lolitas.) In the span of 18 months, the U.S. industry was producing more than 200 pornographic magazines portraying children, from toddlers to teenagers, participating in a variety of sexual perversions. Publications included Incest: The Game the Whole Family Can Play, Children Love, Torrid Tots, Succulent Youth, and Lollitots.
Profits were enormous. In Los Angeles, police estimated that a pornographic publication produced for 35–50 cents retailed for $7.50 to $12.50
per copy. Children could earn up to $150 a day posing for pictures or movies. In Los Angeles, police found one 12-year-old boy was making up to $1,000 a day as a prostitute.
The child pornography business prospered in part because the country lacked laws designed to protect children from sexual exploitation. Outside of a juvenile delinquency act, which sought to curtail runaways and school truants, there were no federal protections for children. Of those federal laws addressing obscenity, legal confusion stymied efforts to crack down on predators. All too many obscenity cases were protected by First Amendment challenges on the grounds that any prosecution involving print or film media infringes on the right of free expression.
State laws classified child molestation crimes as misdemeanors, carrying little or no penalties. Laws against “deviant sexual conduct” or “lewd conduct” were rarely enforced.
Pornographers could be prosecuted for crimes of child abuse but it was extremely difficult to catch them in the act since filming was done in private homes. When they were apprehended, children were often unwilling to testify out of a sense of loyalty for the favors and gifts they received. According to one Los Angeles police report, “Many suspects are wealthy and financially secure men who can afford to give elaborate gifts including automobiles and motorcycles to their victims.”5